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108 
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION 
ACT OF 2006: A WELCOME—AND 
NEEDED—CHANGE 
Dale M. Cendali & Bonnie L. Schriefer* † 
Some have argued that the changes to the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act (the “FTDA”) embodied in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006 (the “TDRA”) threaten to infringe upon the right to 
free speech. This is simply not the case. The FTDA has always protected 
First Amendment rights, and the TDRA clarifies and strengthens those pro-
tections. 
While the concept of dilution was introduced in 1927, there was no fed-
eral dilution law in the United States until 1995, when Congress passed the 
FTDA. Since then, various federal courts have reached different conclusions 
regarding issues such as: (1) what constituted fame, including whether 
marks that were only famous in a niche market could be protected; 
(2) whether the FTDA applied to marks that had acquired distinctiveness; 
and (3) how to prove dilution. 
The most prominent question was whether the FTDA required trademark 
owners to show a “likelihood” of dilution or “actual economic injury” to 
prevail. The issue was finally settled when the Supreme Court decided 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. In Moseley, the Court was faced with 
deciding “whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of 
a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjec-
tive ‘likelihood of dilution’ standard) is a requisite for relief under the 
FTDA.” The Court held that the FTDA “unambiguously requires a showing 
of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution,” but also decided that 
“actual loss of sales or profits” is not necessary to show that actual dilution 
occurred. Unfortunately, the Court gave very little guidance as to how a plain-
tiff proves that actual dilution occurred, other than to note that “direct 
evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual 
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dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence,” such as 
where the marks at issue are identical. The Court also raised a question 
many may have thought was not open: whether tarnishment was included in 
the scope of the FTDA. 
After Moseley was decided, it became clear that certain parts of the 
FTDA ought to be amended and clarified. Among other aspects, trademark 
owners were concerned about the Court’s holding that only “actual dilution” 
is actionable without clarifying how to establish “actual dilution.” The 
TDRA resolves this issue, as well as other issues involving fame, blurring, 
and tarnishment that had arisen in cases decided under the FTDA. 
Fame 
• Marks that are only recognized in limited geographic areas or niche 
markets do not qualify for dilution protection under the TDRA, which 
provides that “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States . . . .”  
 
• Marks with acquired distinctiveness, as well as inherently distinctive 
marks, are protected by the TDRA. To ensure that only truly distinctive 
marks are protected, the TDRA provides that both forms of distinctive-
ness be considered both when determining if a mark is famous and when 
deciding if there is a likelihood of dilution. 
 
• Other factors to be used to determine whether a mark has achieved the 
requisite degree of fame relate to advertising and publicity of the mark, 
sales of goods or services offered under the mark, the “extent of actual 
recognition of the mark,” and whether the mark is registered. 
Tarnishment & Blurring 
• The TDRA expressly provides for protection against tarnishment, which 
is defined as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark 
or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the fa-
mous mark.”  
 
• Blurring is defined in the TDRA as an “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs 
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”  
Proof of Dilution 
• The TDRA makes clear that only a likelihood of dilution need be shown 
to obtain relief. This is intended to provide a means for trademark own-
ers to stop dilution in its inception, instead of making them wait until 
actual harm to the distinctive nature of the mark occurs. 
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• In a claim for dilution by blurring, the TDRA provides that courts 
should consider several factors to determine whether dilution is likely to 
occur, including the similarity between the allegedly dilutive mark and 
the famous mark; the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of 
the famous mark; whether use of the famous mark is “substantially ex-
clusive;” the extent of recognition of the famous mark; the intent of the 
user of the allegedly dilutive mark; and any “actual association” between 
the allegedly dilutive mark and the famous mark. 
 
* * * 
 
Originally, the proposed amendments to the FTDA did not change the 
law’s existing defenses because those defenses provided courts with effec-
tive means to balance free speech rights against trademark owners’ right to 
protect their marks from dilution. Case law shows that when plaintiffs 
brought suit in situations even arguably relating to political commentary, 
social commentary or parody, they lost. For example, in Mastercard Interna-
tional Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., the district court in the 
Southern District of New York determined that Nader’s use of Mastercard’s 
trademarks in advertisements was “political in nature and . . . therefore . . . 
exempted from coverage by the [FTDA].” And in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Productions, the Ninth Circuit found that defendant’s pictures of 
Barbie dolls “in danger of being attacked by vintage household appliances” 
were parodies, and thus noncommercial speech not subject to the FTDA. In 
another case involving Barbie, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., a court 
found that MCA’s use of “Barbie” in the “Barbie Girl” song was “dilutive” 
and caused “a classic blurring injury,” but because the use did “more than 
propose a commercial transaction,” it was noncommercial speech beyond 
the reach of the FTDA. Similarly, in American Family Life Insurance v. 
Hagan, AFLAC brought suit against Hagan, claiming that his political ad-
vertisements featuring the “TaftQuack” duck violated the FTDA. While the 
court found that Hagan’s advertisements constituted use in commerce, it 
also found that the advertisements embodied political speech, and were thus 
a noncommercial use outside the reach of the FTDA. The court reached this 
conclusion even though it was “incontestable that Hagan [was] ‘coattail rid-
ing’” on AFLAC’s duck.  
Trademark owners who brought claims like those described above were 
often criticized by the trademark bar. For those reasons, there did not seem 
to be any reason to amend the defenses of the FTDA. During congressional 
hearings regarding the proposed amendments, however, concerns were 
raised about the FTDA’s protection of free speech. In response to those con-
cerns, language was added to make it clear that the TDRA cannot be used to 
enjoin parodies or other commentary. Therefore, the TDRA provides: 
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment under this subsection: 
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(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilita-
tion of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a 
designation of source for the person’s own goods or services, including the 
use in connection with— 
 (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods 
or services; or 
 (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the 
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. 
 
This language was intended to mirror cases such as those involving 
“Barbie Girl” and the TaftQuack duck in which courts declined to enjoin 
even dilutive uses of a trademark based on First Amendment concerns. 
Those cases and others decided under the FTDA show that the law’s built-in 
protections of free speech rights were effective. Those protections will only 
be bolstered by the TDRA. 
Nonetheless, critics have raised two principal issues about the TDRA 
and its supposed impact on free speech. The first is whether the TDRA only 
applies to noncommercial use in commerce. That question arises from the 
fact that § (c)(1) of the FTDA stated that an injunction may issue against a 
“commercial use of a mark or trade name in commerce,” while the word 
“commercial” is omitted from the same section of the TDRA. The defenses 
section of the TDRA, however, like the FTDA, expressly permits “noncom-
mercial use.” Therefore, the removal of the word “commercial” from 
§ (c)(1) is of no effect.  
The second issue critics of the TDRA have raised is whether the use of 
the language “this subsection” in place of “section” will prohibit defendants 
from raising fair use as a defense to infringement claims brought under 
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects unregistered trademarks. The use 
of the word “section” in the FTDA, however, was essentially a typo that 
never had any legal effect. Nothing in the legislative history or any court 
opinion suggests that the FTDA was intended to modify any of the other 
parts of the Lanham Act; in fact, even though the FTDA is part of § 43 of 
the Lanham Act, it has always been viewed as a separate statute. Correcting 
this error will have no effect on defendants’ ability to assert a fair use de-
fense in § 43(a) claims. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Bosley Medical Institute, 
Inc. v. Kremer expressly rejected the argument that “by using the word ‘sec-
tion,’ rather than the more precise term ‘subsection,’ Congress meant for the 
proviso to apply to all of [Section 43], as opposed to [S]ubsection (c).”  
It is clear thus that despite what critics of the TDRA say, fair use de-
fenses are also available in an infringement claim based on the use of an 
unregistered mark. When the Second Circuit decided Rogers v. Grimaldi in 
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1989, the defenses enumerated in § 43(c) of the Lanham Act did not exist. 
Even so, the court held—and rightly so—that § 43(a) “should be construed 
to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding confu-
sion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” Therefore, the court 
found that “Ginger and Fred,” when used as a film title, did not infringe 
Ginger Rogers’s trademark rights. Rogers was applied in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., where a court held that the 
“degree of risk of confusion [between the Cliffs Notes study guides and de-
fendant’s parody of those guides] does not outweigh the well-established 
public interest in parody.” Similarly, in New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Publishing, Inc., a court held that the First Amendment “provide[d] 
immunity to defendants on plaintiffs’ federal and state trademark infringe-
ment claims,” including their § 43(a) claim, which was based on defendants’ 
use of “New Kids on the Block” in connection with their poll regarding the 
music group of the same name.  
Cases decided after the FTDA was passed reached similar conclusions 
without relying upon FTDA defenses. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, 
Inc., for example, a court rejected Tiger Woods’s § 43(a) false endorsement 
claim against an artist that used Woods’s likeness in a painting because 
“[t]he risk of misunderstanding [as to the source of the painting] is so out-
weighed by the interest in artistic expression as to preclude application of 
the [Lanham] Act.” These cases make it clear that, despite claims to the con-
trary, the TDRA will not change the fact that fair use is a defense to a claim 
of infringement of an unregistered trademark. 
 
* * * 
 
Cases decided over the past ten years show that the FTDA always pro-
vided ample protection to free speech rights. The TDRA, which makes clear 
that parody, criticism, and commentary are not actionable under federal di-
lution law, will serve only to strengthen those protections. Moreover, 
defendants in § 43(a) cases may still argue that their use is a permissible fair 
use. In short, concerns that the TDRA will threaten First Amendment rights 
are unfounded. 
